The HSR Act at 50: Is the Increasing Merger-Enforcement Role of State Attorneys General a Durable Shift or Fleeting Moment?

The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (“HSR Act”)¹ turned 50 on September 30, 2026. As the HSR Act crosses this milestone, we are seeing an increasing level of merger enforcement commentary and activity from state attorneys general independent of the federal antitrust enforcers. Since the HSR Act’s passage, U.S. merger-enforcement has primarily been the province of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), with states playing a supporting role. In our federalist system, state attorneys general have always had the authority to enforce federal antitrust law and (of course) pursue actions under the antitrust laws of their state. But historically, it has been a rare exception for any state or group of states to investigate much less challenge a merger after the transaction has been cleared (conditionally or otherwise) by the FTC or DOJ. It is not so exceptional anymore.

This article begins by outlining the traditional framework for federal and state collaboration in U.S. merger-enforcement under the HSR Act before highlighting certain actions recently taken by state attorneys general offices (and state legislatures) that signal an apparent shift away from that framework—at least with respect to specific states. Then, the article concludes with some thoughts on the potential issues and areas of concern that are presented by this shift.

Traditional Framework for U.S. Merger Enforcement

The first federal antitrust law was passed in the late 1800s and the individual states followed over time by adopting their own antitrust laws that largely mirrored the federal statutes. And, as a general proposition, state courts have typically followed federal antitrust precedents.² Since the passage of the HSR Act, the DOJ and the FTC have directed premerger enforcement in the United States. Different from the older federal antitrust statutes (e.g., the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914) individual states did not seek to pass laws mirroring the requirements of the HSR Act.

After the HSR Act became effective in 1978,³ the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) formed an antirust task force to facilitate coordination between the offices of attorneys general of different states on antitrust investigations and litigation. Now called the “Multistate Antitrust Task Force” of the NAAG, state enforcers ordinarily have cooperated with the DOJ and FTC on merger investigations conducted under the HSR Act and joined the DOJ and/or FTC actions challenging mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act when a resolution could not be reached without litigation following the HSR review period.

Facilitated by confidentiality waivers, state and federal investigators have collaborated to scrutinize proposed mergers with the states historically playing a supplemental role; the Attorney General of Colorado recently referred to this as the “model of ‘cooperative federalism.'”⁴ On the enforcement side, benefits from this collaboration included the states leveraging the antitrust staffing and resources of the DOJ and FTC and sharing their state-level expertise to vindicate their states’ interests.⁵ For the private parties to the proposed transaction under scrutiny, this coordination enabled a consolidated review with FTC or DOJ staff serving as the primary audience for advocacy and in any remedy negotiations. Of late, however, the attorney general offices of several states have begun to take a more proactive approach to premerger review and have been striking an aggressive enforcement posture, increasingly deviating from the enforcement position of the federal antitrust agencies. Several have ramped up their resources through expanded staffing (including hiring some former enforcers from the FTC or DOJ), budget increases, retaining private law firms to prosecute cases on their behalf, and forming multistate enforcement coalitions.⁶

Shift in State Merger Enforcement

Beginning in the first Trump administration, the historical alignment between state and federal merger enforcement began to crack. In its 2018 investigation of Bayer/Monsanto, DOJ reached a proposed settlement with Bayer, clearing the deal.⁷ During the Tunney Act⁸ public comment period, the attorney general offices for California, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Oregon jointly criticized the DOJ’s settlement.⁹ The opposition letter argued that the proposed settlement “risk[ed] creating a monopoly” and criticized the adequacy of the approved divestiture buyer as well as the sufficiency of the commitments in the consent decree.¹⁰ In its response to the public comments, the DOJ noted that additional remedies proposed by the states were “unnecessary” to protect competition.¹¹ The settlement received judicial approval in early 2019 and represented the largest divestiture package ever achieved by the DOJ.¹²

Later that year, the attorney general’s offices in nine states¹³ and the District of Columbia filed a complaint challenging T-Mobile’s proposed acquisition of Sprint without the DOJ, which directed the substantive investigation of the deal at the federal level.¹⁴ The proposed transaction, which represented the second attempt by the parties to combine after it was blocked during the Obama administration, involved the combination of the third and fourth largest wireless network carriers in the United States.¹⁵ Shortly after the complaint was filed, the DOJ announced a proposed settlement with the parties that was joined by the attorney general’s offices in five different states.¹⁶ In the press release accompanying the settlement, Makan Delrahim, then Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division notably thanked the “state partners for joining … in this settlement.”¹⁷  Following the announcement, Colorado left the states’ complaint to sign on to the DOJ’s proposed settlement prompting Delrahim to express his pleasure “that Colorado has left the New York and California litigation and is seeking to join our settlement.”¹⁸

The remaining states and the District of Columbia continued with their complaint and presented their case in a two-week bench trial before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The court ruled for the parties, denying the state attorney generals’ request for a permanent injunction.¹⁹  In its decision, the judge did not credit the contention that the DOJ’s settlement was insufficient. Following the decision, T-Mobile/Sprint entered into additional state-specific settlement terms, beyond the DOJ-negotiated settlement, to resolve the lingering dispute (e.g., state-specific job creation and maintenance targets, geographic coverage commitments; and charitable contributions).²⁰

During the Biden Administration, merger enforcement misalignment continued but with a shift against federal action. In August of 2022, the FTC issued a staff policy paper challenging the validity of certificates of public advantage (“COPA”) laws.²¹ In practice, COPA laws permit state authorities to approve hospital mergers in concentrated markets where they find that the benefits of the merger outweigh the competitive harm. However, the FTC argued that COPA certifications frequently sought to immunize anticompetitive hospital mergers. States criticized the FTC’s paper as overreaching.²²

The issue came to a head in April 2023 when the FTC challenged a Louisiana hospital merger after the state attorney general issued a COPA, blessing a $150 million merger of three hospitals located in the greater New Orleans area.²³ The FTC hit the parties with a gun jumping violation for failing to submit an HSR filing. The parties, joined by the state of Louisiana, sought a declaratory judgement clarifying that the HSR Act did not apply to COPA sanctioned mergers. On September 27, 2023, a federal court agreed with Louisiana and the merging parties that the state-action doctrine exempted a hospital transaction where the state of Louisiana issued a COPA.²⁴

Following that, states continued to pursue initiatives to enhance their independent enforcement capabilities. In 2024, the Uniform Law Commission proposed the Uniform Antitrust Pre-Merger Notification Act, which (if adopted) would provide a mechanism requiring parties to transactions subject to the HSR Act to send copies of their HSR filings to the attorney general’s offices of those states with which the parties had a sufficient nexus.²⁵ The act was recommended to states as a way to facilitate their own antitrust review by enabling state attorneys general to review HSR filings at approximately the same time they are submitted to the DOJ and FTC, rather than placing the onus on the attorney general offices to reach out to the parties or issue a subpoena for the material. Importantly, this law would not impose a suspensory obligation on parties to deals (i.e., the state attorneys general offices would need to obtain an injunction from a court if they want to prevent the deal from closing. Colorado and Washington were the first to adopt the law) effective in the summer of 2025.²⁶ California passed its version of the law this year, and it will take effect on January 1, 2027.²⁷ The legislatures in the District of Columbia, Indiana, Nevada, West Virgina, and Hawaii have introduced similar laws but have yet to adopt them.²⁸

As these laws have only been in effect for a short period of time, it is not clear whether they presage an even greater increase in state-level merger enforcement. In a statement from earlier this year, Colorado’s First Assistant Attorney General Bryn Williams emphasized that the law is intended to speed up cooperation with the federal government and increase predictability; specifically, the facilitation of efficient resource allocation that “lets the states focus on a smaller subset … of transactions.”²⁹ At a 2026 conference, the Senior Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Section of the California Department of Justice, Paula Blizzard, expressed a more ambivalent sentiment noting that “there are periods where there are simply a lot more merger filings; the more filings you get, possibly the more disagreements you could have [with the DOJ and/or FTC]…[and] we may be headed into one of those periods now.”³⁰ In practice, the attorneys general for Colorado and Washington have acknowledged that they are receiving more filings than expected with over 250 HSR filings received in Colorado since August 2025 and over 200 in Washington.³¹ The staff has not grown significantly to account for the influx of these HSR filings.³²

Apart from the Uniform Antitrust Pre-Merger Notification Act, certain state attorneys general offices have taken other actions that diverge from the position of the federal antitrust agencies posture during this second Trump administration. For example, in October of 2025, thirteen attorneys general sought to intervene in the settlement proceeding resolving the DOJ’s challenge of the proposed $14 billion merger of Hewlett Packard Enterprises and Juniper Networks.³³ The attorneys general contended that the DOJ’s proposed settlement was an inadequate remedy.³⁴

Following that, there has been a string of more recent examples of state-federal divergence in merger enforcement. One is the pending state-led challenge of the proposed $6.2 billion merger between Nexstar Media Group and Tegna Enterprises which has already been cleared by the DOJ and the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”). Eight state attorneys general³⁵ filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the transaction on the same day that it was cleared by the DOJ and FCC.³⁶ In connection with the initiation of the litigation, California Attorney General Bonta stated that “the Trump Administration has shown states and consumers that it is more concerned with protecting corporate interests than doing its job to defend the public and uphold consumer protection and antitrust laws that help make life affordable for American families.”³⁷

The federal district court judge issued a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to suspend the deal until it made its decision on whether to grant a permanent injunction. On April 22, Tegna appealed, defending the transaction as procompetitive and indicating that it cannot comply with the TRO because doing so would mean Tegna would fail to meet their debt obligations, contractual distribution agreements, and commitments to the FCC.³⁸ Subsequently, five additional states³⁹ joined the litigation, bringing the complainant states to a total of 13.⁴⁰

Also in April, a state-led coalition was successful at trial in its case against Live Nation Entertainment and its subsidiary, Ticketmaster, for antitrust violations.⁴¹ Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia sued the entertainment company for allegedly monopolizing the market for concert venues.⁴² The states pursued the case despite the DOJ agreeing to settle its case in March. After a jury found that Live Nation and Ticketmaster had violated federal antitrust law, the coalition of attorneys general filed a proposal asking for structural remedies including the divestiture of Ticketmaster as well as Live Nation-owned and operated amphitheatres among other commitments.⁴³ The remedies trial is slated for early 2027.⁴⁴ 

More recently, the DOJ announced that it closed its investigation into Paramount Skydance Corp’s $100 billion acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery Inc.⁴⁵ The DOJ concluded the acquisition was unlikely to harm consumers despite an announcement by the New York Attorney General’s Office days prior that 12 states were preparing to sue Paramount to prevent the acquisition.⁴⁶ Despite receiving clearance from the DOJ and the FCC, the states sued to block the merger alleging it combined two of the five major owners of basic cable channels and two of the five major film distributors.  On September 21st, the states announced that they reached a settlement with Paramount that includes commitments to increase domestic production, and a mandate to release over 60 films in theaters over the next five years, among other provisions.⁴⁷

Conclusion

To be sure, state attorneys general have long had the authority to investigate and challenge mergers. And high-profile deals in politically charged industries (e.g., technology, healthcare, agriculture, etc.) or that implicate state-specific constituencies have always attracted some attention from state antitrust enforcers. But the adoption of legislation in certain states to insert their attorney generals’ offices more directly into the premerger review process is a game changer. With more legislation pending or forthcoming in certain states—including potentially lowering the legal standard for establishing a proposed merger’s illegality⁴⁸—the boundaries for this state-level merger-review framework are not yet firm.

Some contend that the trigger for this recent elevation of state merger enforcement actions is a perceived laxness in antitrust enforcement at the federal level.⁴⁹ Regardless of the trigger, however, the rise in state-level merger enforcement introduces a significant new variable that parties must consider as they assess the feasibility of and schedule for closing strategic M&A transactions. The investments being made at the state level to bulk-up their antitrust enforcement capabilities do not appear temporary, and some return on that investment will be sought. While the political leanings and motivations of antitrust enforcers in some states may shift with a change in administrations at the federal level, the incentives to initiate antitrust scrutiny of strategic combinations will remain strong in others.

That provided, the role of the federal antitrust agencies and Congress in the conduct of merger review is not going away. The operating budget to the DOJ and the FTC is still several times larger than state-level antitrust enforcement budgets.⁵⁰ Moreover, Congressman Fitzgerald (WI) introduced in September draft legislation to provide the FTC and DOJ “with exclusive authority to review or challenge certain mergers and acquisitions with an inherent interstate or international nexus.”⁵¹ While the prospect of this legislation to become law in the near term may be small, the issue of federal pre-emption may come to the fore if and when state-level review becomes so burdensome as to inhibit interstate commerce and/or states attempt to introduce a suspensory element to their premerger review statutes. 

This moment of divergence between federal and state merger enforcement has emerged in fairly short order and may be reaching a point of peak intensity. Whether it endures or recedes over time is difficult to predict. In the interim, state-level involvement may complicate and prolong merger reviews—presenting the opportunity to set precedents that may be challenging to overcome or reverse. As groundbreaking as the HSR Act was at its inception, its second semicentennial is off to provocative start.

Citations

1.       Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a.

2.       See generally, Cooley, Gwendolyn J., 25 Years of State Antitrust Enforcement: Five Cases that Matter, 29 Geo. Mason. L. Rev. 999 (2022), available at https://lawreview.gmu.edu/print__issues/25-years-of-state-antitrust-enforcement-five-cases-that-matter/.

3.       The HSR Act’s premerger notification program became effective on September 5, 1978—the date when the implementing rules became final. See 43 FR 33450, available at: https://archives.federalregister.gov/issue_slice/1978/7/31/33364-33483.pdf#page=87.

4.       Attorney General Phil Weiser’s remarks to The Georgetown Antitrust Symposium available at: AG Remarks: Antitrust Enforcement in the Era of Checks and Balances Federalism (Sept. 15, 2026) – Colorado Attorney General | Colorado Attorney General

5.       See, e.g., California Antitrust Law and Mergers Group 2, California Law Revision Commission, (2022), available at https://clrc.ca.gov/pub/Misc-Report/ExRpt-B750-Grp2.pdf.

6.       Wilts, Alex, US states to expand resources for antitrust enforcement, MLex, (May 11, 2026), available at www.mlex.com/mlex/articles/2476324/us-states-push-to-expand-resources-for-antitrust-enforcement.

7.       Vogt, RJ, 5 State AGs Argue Against $62 B Bayer-Monsanto Deal, Law 360, (Aug. 13, 2018), available at: https:// www.law360.com/articles/1072817.

8.       Under Tunney Act procedures, federal courts review and approve consent decrees between civil defendants and the Department of Justice subject to a 60-day public comment period to evaluate whether the settlement is in the public interest.

9.       Letter from Deputy Attorney General Nicole S. Gordon, to Kathleen S. O’Neill, (Aug. 10, 2018), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/180810%20States%27%20Tunney%20Act%20Comments%20Letter_0.pdf.

10.    Id. 

11.    United States v. Bayer AG et al.; Response to Public Comments, 84 FR. 1493, (Feb. 4, 2019), available at: https:// www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/04/2019-00810/united-states-v-bayer-ag-et-al-response-to-public-comments

12.    Simpson, Dave, $62B Bayer-Monsanto Deal Gets Final OK Despite Pushback, Law360, (Feb. 8, 2019), available at https://www.law360.com/articles/1127435.

13.    The nine states were New York, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Virginia, and Wisconsin. These states were later joined by Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Nevada.

14.    Compl. State of New York et al v. Deutsche Telekom AG et al., 1:19-cv-05434 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 11, 2019), available at: gov.uscourts.nysd.517350.2.0.pdf.

15.    Arbel, Tali, Anderson, Mae, States sue to stop $26.5 billion T-Mobile-Sprint merger, PBS News, (Jun. 11, 2019), available at https:// www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/states-sue-to-stop-26-5-billion-t-mobile-sprint-merger.

16.    Justice Department Settles with T-Mobile and Sprint in Their Proposed Merger by Requiring a Package of Divestitures to Dish, Office of Public Affairs United States Department of Justice, (Jul. 26, 2019), available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-settles-t-mobile-and-sprint-their-proposed-merger-requiring-package. Joining in the settlement were the state attorneys general offices of Nebraska, Kansas, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Dakota.

17.    Id.

18.    Justice Department Welcomes Colorado Joining T-Mobile/Sprint Settlement, Office of Public Affairs United States Department of Justice, (Oct. 28. 2019), available at https:// www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-welcomes-colorado-joining-t-mobilesprint-settlement.

19.    Feiner, Lauren, Judge approves $26 billion merger of T-Mobile and Sprint, CNBC, (Feb. 11, 2020), available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/11/sprint-soars-after-judge-approves-its-merger-with-t-mobile.html. 

20.    Ige, David, Y., Connors, Clare E., Hawaii Attorney General Announces Agreement with T-Mobile/Sprint Merger, Hawaii Department of the Attorney General, (March 11, 2020), available at: https://ag.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/News-Release-2020-30.pdf; Attorney General Becerra Announces Settlement Ending the State’s Challenge to T-Mobile, Sprint Merger, State of California Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General, (Mar. 11, 2020), available at https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-announces-settlement-ending-state’s-challenge-t-mobile; Attorney General Ford Negotiates Settlement for T-Mobile-Sprint Merger Prioritizing Nevada Jobs, State of Nevada, (Nov. 25, 2019), available at: https://ag.nv.gov/News/PR/2019/Attorney_General_Ford_Negotiates_Settlement_for_T-Mobile-Sprint_Merger_Prioritizing_Nevada_Jobs/.      

21.    FTC Policy Perspectives on Certificates of Public Advantage, (Aug. 15, 2022), available at www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/COPA_Policy_Paper.pdf.

22.    Id.

23.    FTC Sues to Stop the Potentially Illegal Integration of New Orleans Area Hospitals Over Failure to Follow Federal Reporting Law, Federal Trade Commission (April 20, 2023), www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/04/ftc-sues-stop-potentially-illegal-integration-new-orleans-area-hospitals-over-failure-follow-federal-reporting-law.

24.    Federal court rejects FTC challenge to state-approved health care partnership, American Hospital Association, (Sept. 28, 2023) www.aha.org/news/headline/2023-09-28-federal-court-rejects-ftc-challenge-state-approved-health-care-partnership.

25.    Antitrust Pre-Merger Notification Act, Uniform Law Commission, (2024), available at: https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=6bf5d101-d698-4c72-b7c1-0191302a6a95.

26.    Burke, Brian, et al., United States: Beyond HSR Filings—Washington and Colorado First to Require State Premerger Notifications, Baker McKenzie, (Mar. 4, 2026), available at: https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2026/03/united-states-california-adopts-uniform-premerger/united-states-beyond-hsr-filings–washington-and-colorado-first-to-require.pdf?sc_lang=en&rev=a2fa90efb51749bb8064d0b702703e87&hash=211DE4FB6421CEA600A4B45D44EB79BE.

27.    Notably, California’s law requires a $1,000 filing fee—neither Colorado nor Washington imposes a filing fee on parties. S.B.25, 2025-2026 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2026).  

28.    Legislative Bill Tracking, Uniform Law Commission, available at www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=6bf5d101-d698-4c72-b7c1-0191302a6a95#LegBillTrackingAnchor, (last visited Sept. 21, 2026).

29.    Brown, supra note 19.

30.    Eslinger, Bonnie, State Antitrust Enforcement on The Upswing, Panelists Agree, Law360, (Feb. 12, 2026), available at: https://www.law360.com/articles/2441251/state-antitrust-enforcement-on-the-upswing-panelists-agree.

31.    Brown, Wesley, State ‘mini-HSR’ filings place burden on attorney general offices, MLex, (Mar. 26, 2026), available at https://www.mlex.com/mlex/articles/2458273/state-mini-hsr-filings-place-burden-on-attorney-general-offices.

32.    Colorado and Washington employ six and fifteen attorneys, respectively, to assess the HSR filings it receives. (See Brown, Wesley, State ‘mini-HSR’ filings place burden on attorney general offices, (Mar. 26, 2026) www.mlex.com/mlex/articles/2458273/state-mini-hsr-filings-place-burden-on-attorney-general-offices). It is unclear whether such limited resources can sustain broad-based merger enforcement, and any necessary budget increases required to for merger enforcement will be prioritized over other enforcement initiatives.

33.    Attorney General Bonta Seeks to Intervene, (October 14, 2025), available at https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-seeks-intervene-allegedly-corrupt-us-doj-hpejuniper

34.    Id.

35.    Complainant states included California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, and Virgina.

36.    Compl. The State of California et al., v. Nexstar Media Group, Inc. et al., 2:26-at-00487 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2026), available at: ca-v-nexstar-complaint-2026.pdf.  

37.    Attorney General Bonta Files Lawsuit Seeking to Block $6.2 Billion Nexstar/Tegna Broadcasting Merger, State of California Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General, (Mar. 18, 2026), available at: https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-files-lawsuit-seeking-block-62-billion-nexstartegna.

38.    Spangler, Todd, Nexstar and Tegna Claim They Can’t Comply with Court Order Halting the Merger Because Certain Actions ‘Cannot Be Undone,’ Variety, (Apr. 1, 2026), available at: https://variety.com/2026/tv/news/nexstar-tegna-merger-tro-court-order-reply-1236704471/.  

39.    Newly added states included Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.

40.    Five more states join lawsuit to block Nexstar-Tegna merger, and one state strikes a deal, KVUE, May 1, 2026, available at: Five more states join lawsuit to block Nexstar-Tegna merger and one state strikes a deal | kvue.com.

41.    Sarmiento, Isabella G., Jury find that Live Nation acted as a monopoly and overcharged ticket buyers, NPR, Apr. 15, 2026, available at www.npr.org/2026/04/15/nx-s1-5786715/live-nation-ticketmaster-antitrust-verdict-monopoly.

42.    Id.

43.    Letter to Judge Subramanian Re: United States et al., v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. et al.; 1:24-cv-03973-AS-SLC, Office of the New York State Attorney General, (May 21, 2026), available at oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/Live%20Nation%20SDNY%20ECF%20No%201497%20COMPLETE.pdf.  

44.    Uebelacker, Erik, After winning antitrust case, states ask court to split up Live Nation and Ticketmaster, Courthouse News Service, (May 22, 2026), available at www.courthousenews.com/after-winning-antitrust-case-states-ask-court-to-split-up-live-nation-and-ticketmaster/.

45.    Varona, Rae Ann, DOJ Clears Paramounts $110B Deal to Acquire Warner Bros., Law 360 (June 12, 2026) www.law360.com/competition/articles/2489391?nl_pk=f2fca3db-1339-49f2-ba4c-c2d69cf60632&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=competition&utm_content=2026-06-15&read_main=1&nlsidx=0&nlaidx=0.

46.    Perlman, Matthew, States Preparing to Challenge Paramount-Warner Bros. Deal, Law 360, (June 8, 2026), www.law360.com/competition/articles/2486867?nl_pk=f2fca3db-1339-49f2-ba4c-c2d69cf60632&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=competition&utm_content=2026-06-09&read_main=1&nlsidx=0&nlaidx=0.

47.    Rizzo, Lillian, Paramount and state AGs settle lawsuit, allowing Warner Bros. merger to proceed, CNBC, (Sept. 21, 2026), available at www.cnbc.com/2026/09/21/paramount-reaches-settlement-over-warner-bros-merger.html.

48.    Memorandum 2026-14, Draft Language Options for Mergers and Acquisitions and Additional Public Comment, Cal. L. Revision Comm’n (Mar. 10, 2026) available at: https://clrc.ca.gov/pub/2026/MM26-14.pdf

49.    See, e.g., Phil, Weiser, AG Remarks: Antitrust Enforcement in the Era of Check and Balances Federalism, (Sept. 15, 2026), available at https://coag.gov/blog-post/ag-remarks-antitrust-enforcement-in-the-era-of-checks-and-balances-federalism-sept-15-2026/.

50.    See, FY 2027 Budget Request At A Glance, Antitrust Division United States Department of Justice, available at: www.justice.gov/jmd/media/1433121/dl?inline; Congressional Budget Justification, Federal Trade Commission, available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/ftc-fy-2027-congressional-budget-justification.pdf. See also Attorney General Phil Weiser’s remarks to The Georgetown Antitrust Symposium available at: AG Remarks: Antitrust Enforcement in the Era of Checks and Balances Federalism (Sept. 15, 2026) – Colorado Attorney General | Colorado Attorney General (“DOJ antitrust division . . . is several times greater than all state antitrust budges combined.”)

51.    Rep. Fitzgerald Introduces Merger Exclusivity Discussion Draft, Office of Congressman Scott Fitzgerald, (Sep. 18, 2026), available at https://fitzgerald.house.gov/media/press-releases/rep-fitzgerald-introduces-merger-exclusivity-discussion-draft.